Gödel's (1949a) remarks concerning the ideality of time are examined. In the literature, some of these remarks have been somewhat neglected while others have been heavily criticized. In this note, we propose a clear and defensible sense in which Gödel's work bears on the question of whether there is an objective lapse of time in our world.
Introduction
The cosmological model given by Gödel (1949) is an exact solution of Einstein's equation in which matter takes the form of a pressure-free perfect fluid. Its peculiar causal properties (e.g. a global time function fails to exist) have been of considerable interest to philosophers of time since they seem to imply the non-extistence of an objective time lapse. But it is not clear how the peculiar features of the Gödel model bear on the nature of time in our own universe. This thought Gödel explicitly considered. He writes (1949a, 561-562):
It might, however, be asked: Of what use is it if such conditions prevail in certain possible worlds? Does that mean anything for the question interesting us whether in our world there exists an objective lapse of time? Gödel (1949a, 562) offers two remarks in response to the questions.
I think it does. For: (1) Our world, it is true, can hardly be represented by the particular kind of rotating solutions referred to above (because the solutions are static and, therefore, yield no redshift for distant objects); there exist however also expanding rotating solutions. In such universes an absolute time might fail to exist, and it is not impossible that our world is a universe of this kind. (2) The mere compatibility with the laws of nature of worlds in which there is no distinguished absolute time...throws some light on the meaning of time in those worlds in which an absolute time can be defined. For, if someone asserts that this absolute time is lapsing, he accepts as a consequence that whether or not an objective lapse of time exists...depends on the particular way in which matter and its motion are arranged in the world. This is not a straightforward contradiction; nevertheless a philosophical view leading to such consequences can hardly be considered as satisfactory.
Concerning remark (1) Gödel has been somewhat neglected (Yourgrau 1991 (2) which, together, serve to clarify the significance of Gödel's work for the nature of time in our world.
Preliminaries
We begin with a few preliminaries concerning the relevant background formalism of general relativity.
1 An n-dimensional, relativistic spacetime (for n ≥ 2) is a pair of mathematical objects (M, g ab ). M is a connected n-dimensional manifold (without boundary) that is smooth (infinitely differentiable). Here, g ab is a smooth, non-degenerate, pseudo-Riemannian metric of Lorentz signature (−, +, ..., +) defined on M . Two spacetimes (M, g ab ) and (M , g ab ) are isometric if there is a diffeomorphism φ : M → M such that φ * (g ab ) = g ab .
For each point p ∈ M , the metric assigns a cone structure to the tangent space M p . Any tangent vector ξ a in M p will be timelike
. Null vectors create the cone structure; timelike vectors are inside the cone while spacelike vectors are outside. A time orientable spacetime is one that has a continuous timelike vector field on M . A time orientable spacetime allows us to distinguish between the future and past lobes of the light cone. In what follows, it is assumed that spacetimes are time orientable.
For some interval I ⊆ R, a smooth curve γ : I → M is timelike if the tangent vector ξ a at each point in γ[I] is timelike. Similarly, a curve is null (respectively, spacelike) if its tangent vector at each point is null (respectively, spacelike). A curve is causal if its tangent vector at each point is either null or timelike. A causal curve is future-directed if its tangent vector at each point falls in or on the future lobe of the light cone. A timelike curve γ : I → M is closed if there are two distinct points s 1 , s 2 ∈ I such that γ(s 1 ) = γ(s 2 ).
For any two points p, q ∈ M , we write p << q if there exists a future-directed timelike curve from p to q. We write p < q if there exists a future-directed causal curve from p to q. These relations allow us to define the timelike and causal pasts and futures of a point p: I − (p) = {q : q << p}, I + (p) = {q : p << q}, J − (p) = {q : q < p}, and J + (p) = {q : p < q}. We say a spacetime (M, g ab ) admits a global time function if there is a smooth function t : M → R such that, for any distinct points p, q ∈ M , if p ∈ J + (q), then t(p) > t(q). The function assigns a "time" to every point in M such that it increases along every (nontrivial) future-directed causal curve. Following the literature (e.g. Earman 1995, Dorato 2002), we take the existence of a global time function to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the objective lapse of time.
Concerning Remark (1)
Gödel's first consideration relating to the ideality of time and our universe is clear: Despite the empirical data collected by cosmologists (e.g. data suggesting an expanding universe), there remains the epistemic possibility that our universe is one in which absolute time cannot be defined. Concerning (1), Yourgrau (1991) , Savitt (1994) and Dorato (2002) are silent. Earman (1995) and Belot (2005) do consider Gödel's claim but swiftly find it unconvincing.
Belot states that Gödel himself grants that the more adequate models of our cosmos support an absolute time (2005, 270) . But the text certainly does not lead us to this conclusion. And we know that, even late in his life, Gödel had still not given up on the possibility that we inhabit a Gödel-type model. Indeed, he would remain intensely interested in the collection of all astronomical data relevant to this possibility (Bernstein 1991) . Earman (1995, 199) claims that "we have all sorts of...experiences which lend strong support to the inference that we do not inhabit a Gödel type universe but rather a universe that fulfills all of the necessary conditions for an objective lapse of time." However, Earman (1995, 199) does leave open the possibility that Gödel's remark (1) can be defended. To do so, it is sufficient to show the following.
There are cosmological models that (i) lack the features necessary for an objective time lapse, but (ii) reproduce the redshift, etc., so that they are effectively observationally indistinguishable from models that fit current astronomical data and have the spatio-temporal structure needed to ground an objective lapse of time.
Earman strongly doubts that one can find "models which allow for time travel and which are observationally indistinguishable from non-time travel models" (1995, 200) . But this remark is puzzling since one need not find models which are so causally misbehaved as to allow for time travel -it would suffice to find models which lack some feature or other necessary for an objective time lapse. And it has already been shown by Malament (1977, 79-80 ) that the relation of observational indistinguishability as introduced by Glymour (1977) and used by Earman (1995) does not always preserve some properties necessary for an objective time lapse (in particular, the existence of a global time function). Also, the relation of observational indistinguishability as introduced by Glymour is symmetric and allows observers to live eternally. But, these conditions can be justifiably softened. Indeed, Malament (1977) has introduced the weaker relation: the spacetime (M, g ab ) is weakly observationally indistinguishable from the spacetime (M , g ab ) if for every point p ∈ M there is a point p ∈ M such that I − (p) and I − (p ) are isometric. So, one might now wonder if there are cosmological models that fit current astronomical data which are weakly observationally indistinguishable from models that lack features necessary for an objective time lapse (in particular, the existence of a global time function). And it turns out that there are. In fact, one can show that every cosmological model is weakly observationally indistinguishable from some model which lacks features necessary for an objective time lapse. Proposition 1. Every spacetime (M, g ab ) is weakly observationally indistinguishable from a spacetime (M , g ab ) which fails to have a global time function.
It should be clear that the proposition (a proof is given in the Appendix) provides support for Gödel's remark (1). Indeed, it remains an epistemic possibility, just as Gödel claimed it was, that we inhabit a world which has no objective time lapse. Further, even in the face of any (as yet uncollected) astronomical data, this epistemic possibility remains. One final comment concerning the proposition: It makes precise the heavily criticized statement made elsewhere by Gödel that "the experience of the lapse of time can exist without an objective lapse of time" (Gödel 1949a , 561).
Concerning Remark (2)
Gödel's second remark is sometimes interpreted to be an argument that time in our universe is ideal (Savitt 1994; Earman 1995; Dorato 2002) . But this reading seems to be a bit strong. Gödel only states that "the mere compatibility with the laws of nature of worlds in which there is no distinguished absolute time...throws some light on the meaning of time in those worlds in which an absolute time can be defined." In other words, the existence of Gödel-type solutions simply have implications regarding the nature of time for all cosmological models. However, it seems "there is a consensus that even this modest conclusion is not warranted" (Smeenk and Wüthrich 2011, 597).
Now we have already shown that the non-existence of a global time function in certain models does have epistemic implications for all models. But Gödel seems to have something more in mind concerning remark (2) . Indeed, of great importance seems to be that fact that "whether or not an objective lapse of time exists...depends on the particular way in which matter and its motion are arranged in the world." And it is unclear how this statement leads to any general implications concerning all models. Here, we provide one way to spell out some of the details.
Consider an arbitrary model (M, g ab ) which has all the geometric properties necessary for absolute time. In particular, assume it admits a global time function. Following Gödel, consider an observer at some point p ∈ M who "asserts that this absolute time is lapsing." Since time is lapsing objectively, this means that at p -the event of the assertion -all events in the set I + (p) have yet to "come into existence" (Gödel 1949a, 558) . In other words, at p, if one takes the idea of an objective time lapse seriously, one is led to consider as fixed not the spacetime (M, g ab ) but rather merely a portion of it. It is then natural to wonder if there is a sense in which this leaves open from the perspective of the observer making the assertion the nomological possibility that, after the time of the assertion, matter and its motions might be (re)arranged in such a way that a global time function can no longer be defined. This question of whether a cosmological model can "start out" with well-behaved causal structure but not "end up" that way was, in a sense, asked some time ago by Stein (1970, 594) .
Consider either an arbitrary given cosmological model, or a model having the structure of one of the sorts assumed to hold in the real world. Then: is it ((a) ever, (b) always) possible to introduce into such a model a continuous deformation of the structure, leading through intermediate states, all compatible with Einstein's theory, to a state in which Gödel-type relationships occur?
Here is one way to formulate this question precisely. Let (M, g ab ) be any spacetime which admits a global time function. For any point p ∈ M , is there is a spacetime (M, g ab ) which (i) fails to admit a global time function and (ii) is such that g ab = g ab on the region M − I + (p)? When (M, g ab ) is at least three-dimensional, yes. Proposition 2. Let (M, g ab ) be any spacetime of dimension n ≥ 3 which admits a global time function. For any point p ∈ M , there is a spacetime (M, g ab ) which (i) fails to admit a global time function and (ii) is such that g ab = g ab on the region M − I + (p).
It should be clear how the proposition (proof given in the Appendix) can be used to understand Gödel's remark (2) . It is philosophically unsatisfying (though not a contradiction) for one to assert that time is objectively lapsing in one's universe when from the perspective of the observer making the assertion there remains the nomological possibility that, after the time of the assertion, matter and its motions might be smoothly (re)arranged in such a way so as to prohibit an objective time lapse.
Conclusion
Despite the above propositions, one might insist that "we do not inhabit a Gödel type universe but rather a universe that fulfills all of the necessary conditions for an objective lapse of time" (Earman 1995, 199) . We close with one final word of caution. It seems reasonable that "in order to be physically significant, a property of space-time ought to have some form of stability, that is to say, it should also be a property of 'nearby' space-times" (Hawking and Ellis 1973, 197) . There are a number of different ways to understand the notion of nearby spacetimes -none entirely satisfactory (Geroch 1971 , Fletcher 2015 ). Here we simply note one sense in which causally well-behaved spacetimes can be "close" to spacetimes which are not.
Consider the one-parameter family of spacetimes (M, g ab (λ)) where
. But what about (M, g ab (0))? Surprisingly, one finds it is Minkowski spacetime.
2 Thus, there is sense in which a model satisfying all of the necessary conditions for an objective lapse of time is "close" to a set of models which do not satisfy these conditions. Shouldn't this fact give us pause?
6 Appendix We can now express g ab|O as f ∇ a t∇ b t + g∇ a x∇ b x + 2h∇ (a t∇ b) x for some smooth scalar fields f :
x be a flat (Lorentzian) metric on O for some smooth scalar fields f : O → R, g : O → R, and h : O → R such that η ab at the point ϕ
. Now we divide O into three disjoint regions: U , V , W . For convenience, let r be the scalar function on O defined by √ t 2 + x 2 . Let U be the region where r < δ/3; V the region where δ/3 ≤ r < 2δ/3; W the region where 2δ/3 ≤ r < δ.
Next, we define a field γ ab on each each of the three regions. On region W , let γ ab = g ab . On region U , let γ ab = η ab . On region V , let γ ab be the following:
By inspection, one can see that γ ab is smooth field on O (cf. Geroch 1968, 536). We will work to show that it is a metric. Clearly, it is everywhere symmetric and is non-degenerate on U and W . We claim it is non-degenerate on V as well. For convenience, let f = θf + (1 − θ)f , g = θg + (1 − θ)g , h = θh+(1−θ)h . Let p be any point in V and let ξ a be any vector at p. We can express ξ a as α(∂/∂t) a + β(∂/∂x) a for some α, β ∈ R. Consider γ ab ξ a . It must come out as (
2 . But the latter case cannot obtain: Because f (p) < 0 < g(p), f (p) < 0 < g (p), and θ(p) ∈ [0, 1], we know f (p) < 0 < g (p). So α = β = 0 and thus ξ a = 0. So γ ab is non-degenerate on V . So, γ ab is a smooth metric on O . Since γ ab is Lorentzian at ϕ Proof. Let (M, g ab ) be any three-dimensional spacetime (one can generalize to higher dimensions) and let O be any open set in M . By the lemma above, there is an open setÔ in O and a spacetime (M, g ab ) such that g ab is flat onÔ and
is the the open ball B δ (0, 0, 0) centered at the origin in R 3 with radius δ, and (iii) the coordinate maps t : U → R, x : U → R, and y : U → R associated with (U, ϕ) are such that the (flat) metric g ab on U can be expressed as the (flat) metric:
Now we divide U into three disjoint regions: U 1 , U 2 , U 3 . For convenience, let r be the scalar function on U defined by t 2 + x 2 + y 2 . Let U 1 be the region where r < δ/3; U 2 the region where δ/3 ≤ r < 2δ/3; U 3 the region where 2δ/3 ≤ r < δ.
Next, we define a metric g ab on M with the desired properties. On regions U 3 and M − U , let g ab = g ab . On region U 1 , let g ab be Gödelian: −∇ a t∇ b t+∇ a x∇ b x−(1/2) exp (2ax)∇ a y∇ b y −2 exp (ax)∇ (a t∇ b) y where a > 0 is large enough that closed timelike curves exist in U 1 . On region U 2 , let g ab be the following: −∇ a t∇ b t + ∇ a x∇ b x − (1/2) exp (2ax(1 − θ))∇ a y∇ b y − 2 exp (ax(1 − θ))∇ (a t∇ b) y where θ : U 2 → R is just the function θ(r) given in the proof of the above lemma. By inspection, one can see that g ab is a smooth metric on M (cf. Geroch 1968, 536) . By construction, the spacetime (M, g ab ) is such that there are closed timelike curves contained in O and g ab = g ab on M − O. Proposition 2. Let (M, g ab ) be any spacetime of dimension n ≥ 3 which admits a global time function. For any point p ∈ M , there is a spacetime (M, g ab ) which (i) fails to admit a global time function and (ii) is such that g ab = g ab on the region M − I + (p).
Proof. Let (M, g ab ) be any spacetime of dimension n ≥ 3 which admits a global time function. Let p be any point in M . By the second lemma, we know (since I + (p) is an open set) there exists a spacetime (M, g ab ) such that there are closed timelike curves in I + (p) and g ab = g ab on M − I + (p). Of course, the non-existence of a global time function follows from the existence of closed timelike curves.
